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In Lonnie Weeks's capital murder trial in Virginia in 1993, the
jury was instructed:
If you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth has proved be-
yond a reasonable doubt, either of the two alternativ[e aggravating fac-
tors], and as to that alternative you are unanimous, then you may fix the
punishment of the defendant at death or if you believe from all the evi-
dence that the death penalty is not justified, then you shall fix the pun-
ishment of the defendant at life imprisonment .... f
This instruction is plainly ambiguous, at least to a lay audience.
Does it mean that if the jury finds an aggravating factor it must im-
pose the death penalty, or that in that situation it has to make a fur-
ther decision whether to do so? The first answer is %vrong. That is
not the law in Virginia, and if it were it might amount to an unconsti-
tutional "mandatory" scheme for imposing death sentences without
considering evidence the defendant may offer in mitigation. And yet
ajury could easily think the instruction means just that-that a deci-
sion that "the death penalty is notjustified" means a decision that nei-
ther aggravating factor has been proven."
But maybe juries do get it right. Maybe they understand that they
have to consider mitigating evidence about the crime and the defen-
dant after they have determined the existence of an aggravating fac-
tor. That is what the Supreme Court decided two years ago in an-
other Virginia case in which this instruction was used, Buchanan v.
Angelone,' despite a persuasive dissent by Justice Breyer, who pointed
out that in the context of the other instructions that were given it was
at least as easy to interpret this instruction to mean that the jury was
supposed to consider evidence of mitigation solely for the purpose of
deciding whether an aggravating factor exists, and that if they did
find that there was an aggravating factor, then a death sentence -as
Thomas and Mabel Long Professor of Law, University of Michig-,. Phoebe Ellsworth
provided helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
I Weeks v. Angelone, 120 S. Ct. 727, 730 n.1 (2000).
2 The correct interpretation turns on noticing that the verb for die first option in this run-
on sentence is "may," and for the second option -shall." The significance of this difference is
not likely to leap to the minds of most non-law ers. especially since the instruction does not
mention how, when, or on what basis the jury should decide whether "the death penalty is not
justfied."
522 U.S. 269,279 (1998).
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automatic.4 Lonnie Weeks's jury, however, left no room for doubt.
After deliberating on the issue of penalty for several hours they sent a
note to the judge asking the precise question that the Supreme Court
had said this instruction already answered:
If we believe that Lonnie Weeks, Jr. is guilty of at least 1 of the alterna-
tives, then is it our duty as ajury to issue the death penalty? Or must we
decide (even though he is guilty of one of the alternatives) whether or not
to issue the death penalty, or one of the life sentences? What is the Rule?
Please clarify?
5
The judge responded as he had done a few hours earlier to an-
other question from the same jury, by not answering. He sent the
jury a note saying, "[s] ee... Instruction #2"--the very same instruc-
tion that triggered the question in the first place. Judges often do
this when they get questions from those they are supposed to instruct.
Apparently they believe in an older "don't ask, don't tell" policy than
the one that has been in the news: Don't ask me anything, because I
won't tell you anything if you do.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion announced in January, 2000,
was unfazed. In a five to four decision the Court held that "[a] jury is
presumed to follow its instructions."7 And what about the fact that
the jury itself said that it did not know how to follow those instruc-
tions? "Similarly, a jury is presumed to understand a judge's answer
to its question." Which was probably true, in this case. The jury-
which already had the judge's instructions in writing, the
decipherable and the indecipherable alike-no doubt interpreted
the answer exactly as it was intended: "Bug off." The Supreme Court
went on to say that "[h] ad the jury desired further information, they
might, and probably would, have signified their desire to the court.''
Naturally. They had only been rebuffed by the judge twice, and must
have been itching for another chance to have His Honor tell them to
stop bothering him and get on with their work. But even if we ignore
the unmistakable meta-message and assume that the jurors went back
to studying the text of instruction, it is doubtful that after this
exchange they somehow arrived at a correct understanding of the very
instruction that they could not understand in the first place.
Cases like Weeks are not the products of judicial ignorance. It is
tempting to think that if the Court had known more about juries it
might have done a better job. Perhaps somebody should have told
the justices about research that shows that jurors do misunderstand
instructions like this one'°-that in fact, they do a pretty bad job of
4 Id. at 281-82 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
5 Weeks, 120 S. Ct. at 730.
6 Id.
Id. at 733.
* Id.
I d.
Stephen P. Garvey, et al., Correcting Deadly Confusion: Responding to Jury Inquiries in Capital
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understanding legal instructions in general"-but that when such in-
structions are explained or revised it does help and does affect their
decisions. 2 However, I do not believe that would have helped. The
Weeks decision is an example of willful blindness, if not hypocrisy.
The truth is readily apparent in the majority opinion itself: After de-
liberating for several hours, the jurors asked if once they found an
aggravating factor they could still sentence the defendant to life im-
prisonment; the judge refused to say; the jurors returned with a sen-
tence of death. 3 Obviously at least some of thejurors must have con-
cluded-erroneously-that they had no choice. But the Supreme
Court has the power to ignore simple truths.
This attitude is not a new or rare phenomenon. It is a central
theme of many appellate decisions on jury decision making- We
don't want to know. A We don't want to know what instructionsjurors
understand, or what information they remember, or whether they
consider evidence that was excluded, or what facts they rely on, or
what they say in deliberations, or how they arrive at their decisions.
And I don't mean simply thatjudges would rather not be bothered to
find out these things; I suggest that they would rather not know even
if that requires denying the obvious. The Court's underl)ing theory
seems to be something like this: One reason why we commit deci-
sions to juries is to get unchallengeable results. Understanding jury
decision making does not serve that goal. Viewing the institution as
an impenetrable black box is a much more successful strategy. Once
we decide that we can't know what juries do, we may safely "presume"
that whatever it is, it's okay.
Cases, 85 CoRNELL L. RE%,. 627, 629-33 (2000) (studying die precise instruction used in tie e eks
case); Shari Seidman Diamond &Judith N. Levi, hnprotingDrisons on Datah 1A RThugand lest.
ingJuy Instructions, 79 JUDICATURE 224, 225-26 (1996) (studying juror confusion over instruc-
tions on aggravation and mitigation).
VALERIE P. HANs & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THEJ'RY' 12027 (1980); Phoebe C. Ellsworth,
Jury Reform at the End of die Century: Real Agrment, Real Changs, 32 U. Mlui. J.L REFORM 213,
215 (1999);JoeI D. Lieberman & Bruce D. Sales, it7,at Soial Scumire Teaches Uis Abaut the Jury In-
struction Process, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L 589 (1997); Phoebe C. Ellsuorth. Ire Twiveh Heads
Better than One?, 52 L4W& CONTEP. PRODS. 205, 223 (1989).
12 Garvey et al., supra note 10; Diamond & Levi, supra note 10; Alan Reifiman ct at., Real Ju-
rors' Understanding of the Law in Real Cases, 16 L.W &HM. BE.LauV. 539 (1992).
13 ieeks, 120 S. CL at 730-31.
14 For example:
One enduring element of the jury system ... is insulation fron questions about ho-.
juries actually decide .... Instead of inquiring what juries actually understood, and hto-
they really reasoned, courts invoke a -presumption" that jurors understand and folloaw
their instructions .... It is a rule of la--a description of the premises underiving the
jury system, rather than a proposition aboutjurors' abilities and states of nind....
Social science has challenged many premises of thejury systen .... Still. the ability of
jurors to sift good evidence from bad is an axiom of the s)stem, so courts not only pemiut
juries to decide these cases but also bypass the sort of empirical findings that might help
jurors reach better decisions.
Gacy v. Welborn, 994 F.2d 305, 313 (7th Cir. 1993): see also United States '. Thors. 116 F.3d
606, 619 (2d Cir. 1997) ("The jury as we know it is supposed to reach its decisions in te mister
and security of secrecy....
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But what about death penalty cases? Here the stakes are at their
highest, and jurors are asked to perform an unusual function, to
make a once-in-a-lifetime moral judgment-whether a man should
live or die-rather than a factual decision about what happened.
Should we not be more careful to make sure that in these difficult
and extremely important cases jurors understand the law correctly
and apply it fairly? There was a time when the Supreme Court be-
lieved that, and acted on that belief. A large edifice of case law was
built on that basis, starting in 1968 with Witherspoon v. Illinois,'" which
held that states could not exclude opponents of the death penalty
from capital sentencing juries if they could follow the law and con-
sider imposing a death sentence. It includes the Court's landmark
1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia,16 that all death penalty laws then
in effect in the United States were unconstitutional because they al-
lowed for uncontrolled discretion by the capital sentencers, and pro-
duced arbitrary and discriminatory death sentences. That body of
law also includes the Court's 1976 decision in Gregg v. Georgia 7 that
several new post-Furman death penalty laws were (at least presump-
tively) constitutional because of procedural rules that guided capital
sentencing discretion," and it includes the first seven years of cases
attempting to apply the complex and contradictory rules in Furman
and Gregg. For example, in 1978, in Lockett v. Ohio,9 the Court held
that a capital sentencer must be permitted to consider any evidence
about the crime or the criminal that a capital defendant offers as a
basis for a sentence less than death; and in 1980, in Godfrey v. Geor-
gia,2° the Court held that a defendant could not be sentenced to
death on the basis of a finding that the killings he committed were"outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman" unless that term
is given specific content that meaningfully guides and limits the jury's
discretion. 2' For a while, it seems, the Supreme Court led-or at least
participated in-an effort to insure that jury decision making in capi-
tal cases actually lived up to the ideal that the Court had assigned to
it.
In 1983, however, a competing trend emerged,22 and it has be-
come ever stronger and more dominant. A consensus emerged on
15 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
16 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
17 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
18 Id. at 206-07.
19 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
20 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
21 Id. at 427-29.
See, e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 888-91 (1983) (death sentence upheld after one
of three statutory aggravating factors struck down as unconstitutional); Barclay v. Florida, 463
U.S. 939, 956-58 (1983) (death sentence upheld even though one of several aggravating factors
considered in imposing death penalty held to be improper under state law); Barefoot v. Estelle,
463 U.S. 880, 892-93 (1983) (upholding expedited review of federal habeas corpus decisions for
death penalty cases). For an excellent discussion of these cases, see Robert Weisberg, Deregulat-
ingDeath, 1983 Sup. Cr. REv. 305 (1984).
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the Supreme Court (and on other courts, and in legislatures) that too
many death sentences were being reversed, that the review of capital
cases was too exacting, and that the legal process must be redesigned
so executions would happen more often and with less delay. The age-
old legal aphorism that "death is different"-which used to mean that
capital cases were reviewed with special care and held to an uncom-
monly high standard of justice-was turned on its head." It now
means that constitutional issues in capital cases get especially short
shrift because it is important to avoid setting precedents that might
slow down executions. Buchanan and lieds are excellent examples of
this trend. The Court seems to have written these opinions-indeed,
it seems to have taken these cases-to broadcast a message to the
lower courts: Intelligible jury instructions on mitigating eidence are
not required in capital cases, and answers tojury questions on instruc-
tions are not required either.
This is the legal context for the two empirical studies that appear
in this issue, by David Baldus, George Woodworth, David Zuckerman,
Neil Weiner, and Barbara Proffitt;" and by William Bowers, Benjamin
Steiner, and Marla Sandys.'
The lead authors of these articles, David Baldus and Bill Bowers,
represent the polar opposite of the viewpoint now prevalent on the
Supreme Court. They are scholars; they deal in knowledge, in facts.
Each has devoted the lion's share of his career to studying how the
death penalty actually operates in the United States at the end of the
twentieth century. Dr. Bowers, it seems, has studied almost every as-
pect of capital punishment. Among other projects, he conducted the
first post-Furman study of racial discrimination and arbitrariness in
capital sentencing,6 developed an original and widely-copied meas-
ure of public support for the death penalty, - and has been the mov-
ing force behind the monumental decade-long multi-state Capital
Jury Project,2m from which the data that he presented here were de-
2S See, e.g., McCleskeyv. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,347-48 (1987) (BlackmunJ.. dissenting) (nThe
Court today seems to give a new meaning to our recognition that death is different. Rather
than requiring 'a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of tie capital sentencing detemii-
nation,' California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992,998-999 (1983). the Court relies on te %e fact that
this is a case involving capital punishment to apply a /esnrstandard of scrutiny.. .).
24 David C. Baldus, et al., The Use of Pereinptor' Ollenges in Capital Murder TrialW" A Legal and
EmPiricalAnalsis, 3 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 3 (2001)
WilliamJ. Bowers, etal., Death Sneningin Blad: and 117ante An EmptralAnalysu of the Role
of turors'Race and Jury Racial Composition, 3 U. PA.J. Coxs'. L 171 (2001).
William J. Bowers & Glenn L Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrrimnatwn under Post.Furman
Capital Statutes, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 563 (1980); see also WiLU.At J. BoW.s, LEcaL HOICIDE:
DEATH AS PUNISHMENT IN AMEiCA, 1864-1982, at 193-269 (1984).
William Bowers, Capital Punishment and Contemporary' Values: Peopkes Mugnings and the
Court's Mispereptions, 27 LA w&SOC'YREv. 157 (1993).
For a general description of the CapitalJury Project, see UillianiJ. Bowers, Te CapstalJury
Project" Rationale, Design, and Preview of Early Findings, 70 LD. LJ. 1043 (1995); see also WilliamJ.
Bowers, et al., Foreclosed Impartiality in Capital Sentening. Jurors' Predispastions, Guilt-Tnal _xper-
ence, and Premature Decision Making, 83 CORNIEl.L L REV. 1476 (1998) (multistate data): William
J. Bowers & Benjamin D. Steiner, Death by Default: An Empirical Denonstration of False and Forced
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rived. Professor Baldus was the lead investigator in the path-breaking
study of arbitrariness and racial discrimination in capital sentencing
in Georgia29 that was before the Supreme Court in McCleskey v. Kemp,
a study that permanently changed our common knowledge of the
death penalty in America. He has since conducted comparable stud-
ies in New Jersey31and Colorado,32 and most recently here in Phila-
delphia.33 No other living researcher has contributed more to our
understanding of capital punishment than these two men. Their
work is a rebuke to the ignorance and complacency of judges who
write opinions like Weeks v. Angelone.
These two studies both deal with the racial composition of capital
trial juries. This is a subject of great importance. As these research-
ers and others have demonstrated, capital sentencing in the United
States is infected with racial discrimination-most strongly and perva-
sively by the race of the victim, but in some jurisdictions, including
Philadelphia, by the race of the defendant as well." Are these pat-
terns caused, at least in part, by the race of the capital trial jurors?
Everybody who has worked in the area has always assumed that is so,
but until now, nobody had actually studied the issue systematically.
And no wonder-it is very hard to do, as these papers show.
Professor Baldus and his colleagues examined racial disparities in
the exercise of peremptory challenges in jury selection, the initial
stage of a capital trial. It has been common knowledge for decades
that prosecutors and defense attorneys use race as a basis for deciding
which potential jurors to challenge and which to accept. Since Batson
v. Kentuck3 5 in 1986, it has been possible-at least in theory-for a
defendant to challenge race discrimination by the prosecutor in the
exercise of peremptory challenges in his individual case, and since
Georgia v. McCollum in 1992, a prosecutor could make a similar claim
against a criminal defendant. But what actually happens on the
ground? Anecdotal evidence suggests that prosecutors continue to
target minority jurors-especially blacks-and that defense attorneys
continue to target white jurors, and that (judging from published
Choices in Capital Sentencing, 77 TEx. L. REV. 605 (1999) (multistate data).
DAVID C. BALDUS, ET AL., EQUALJUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY (1990).
10 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
31 DAVID C. BALDUS, DEATH PENALTY PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW PROJECT: FINAL REPORT TO
THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT (1991); David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Proportionality
Review of Death Sentences: The View of the Special Master, 6 CHANCE: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR
STATISTICS AND COMPUTING 18 (1993).
32 See BALDUS, ET AL, supra note 29, at 268 n.20.
3s David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An
Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638
(1998).
34 For excellent overviews of the many studies on this issue, see U.S. GEN. ACCTG. OFC.,
DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES (1990);
Baldus et al., supra note 33, at 1658-70, 1742-45.
5 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
505 U.S. 42 (1992).
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opinions) the constitutional remedy provided by Batson is not much
of a check on this process. Anecdotal evidence, however, can be
misleading, and published opinions-which are only available in
cases in which the defendant was convicted, appealed and raised the
issue-are hardly a fair reflection of trial practice. Unfortunately, go-
ing to the source is a huge task that requires compiling detailed rec-
ords on hundreds of cases and thousands of potential jurors. And
this information is not sitting around on the shelves waiting for curi-
ous researchers; it has to be found, at great cost Just determining
the race of the potential jurors in any large sample of cases is very dif-
ficult; in this study, it required a major investigation. Gathering the
case-by-case and juror-byjuror data that we see here is a huge task,
and analyzing those data once compiled is nearly as much work
again.
Judging from the findings that Professor Baldus and his co-
researchers report, practice in Philadelphia capital cases mirrors
common racial stereotypes. Prosecutors use their peremptory chal-
lenges to target prospective jurors who are black, young, and resi-
dents of integrated neighborhoods. They do so more assertively
when the defendant is black and less so when the victim is black. De-
fense attorneys do the opposite on every count. The results are
mixed. Overall, the proportion of blacks on capital juries is slightly
higher than in the jury pool from which those juries are chosen-a
reflection of the fact that defense attorneys use more of their per-
emptory challenges than do prosecutors. On the other hand, prose-
cutors are more successful than defense attorneys at eliminating their
highest priority target group-young black (and especially young
male black) venire members-since blacks are only about 35% of the
pool, and young blacks are a small slice of that fraction. This means
that the young black capital defendants-66% of the total in Phila-
delphia-are overwhelmingly tried by juries that include no young
blackjurors. Defense attorneys are less successful at eliminating their
prime targets-older white venire members--simply because they are
a much larger group.
Baldus and his colleagues interpret these results as indicating that
Batson v. Kentucky has been only partially successful in eliminating ra-
cial discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges. But Batson
was never a serious attempt to eliminate race as a basis for peremptory
challenges. Batson has to be understood against the backdrop of the
notorious case of Swain v. Alabama,4 in which the Supreme Court si-
multaneously held that racial discrimination in the exercise of per-
emptory challenges by prosecutors violates the Equal Protection
3 See, ag., KennethJ. Melli, Batson in Pradice: Miatl li Hare Learned About Batson and Per.
emptory Changes, 71 NOTRE DAME L REv,. 447, 502-03 (1996); Michael J. Raphad & EdmardJ.
Ungvarsky, Excuses, Excuses: Neutral Explanations Under Batson v. Kerntuck)i. 27 U. MICI. J.L
REFORM 229, 274-75 (1993).
4 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
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Clause, and insulated that discrimination from challenge by creating
a "presumption" that "in any particular case" the state has used its
peremptory challenges "to obtain a fair and impartial jury."" To
overcome this presumption, a black defendant had to show that:
the prosecutor in a county, in case after case, whatever the circumstances,
whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may be, is
responsible for the removal of [all] Negroes ... who have survived chal-
lenges for cause, with the result that no Negroes ever serve on [trial] ju-
ries...."12
The impulse for this preposterous standard was the desire to pro-
tect the unreviewable discretion that was understood to be the es-
sence of the right to exercise peremptory challenges. Batson repre-
sents a major retreat from the absolute protection of peremptories
that was embodied in Swain, but it preserves a great deal of room for
unreviewable discretion by prosecutors and defense attorneys alike.
First, for Batson to be triggered the opposing attorney must make a
prima facie showing of discrimination. That typically requires a
strong pattern of racially disproportionate peremptory challenges;
any one or two or three challenges will not be enough, whatever the
challenger's motivation. Second, once Batson is triggered, the attorney
who made the questioned peremptory challenges is permitted to of-
fer non-racial justifications for them. As later Supreme Court cases
make clear, trial court judges may accept such justifications even if
they are implausible43 or have obvious disproportionate racial im-
pacts.44 For example, a prosecutor may strike all qualified jurors who
have been convicted of crimes, even though that will have the effect
of disproportionately removing black men.
The limitations of Batson are not news. Justice Marshall pointed
them out in a concurring opinion in Batson itself, and argued that
"[m] erely allowing defendants the opportunity to challenge the ra-
cially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in individual cases
will not end the illegitimate use of the peremptory challene."' Jus-
tice Marshall proposed eliminating the practice entirely,'6 but his
proposal was rejected, in part because the peremptory challenge was
seen as an "historic trial practice, which long has served the selection
of an impartial jury.... That may or may not be so, but peremp-
tory challenges are certainly deeply embedded in our system of jury
selection. Trial lawyers like peremptory challenges; who doesn't like
to exercise unreviewable power? Trial judges may have misgivings
41 Id. at 222.
42 Id. at 223.
43 Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995).
44 Hernandez v. NewYork, 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
45 476 U.S. 79, 105 (1980) (MarshallJ., concurring).
46 To be exact, since Batson itself only concerned the exercise of peremptory challenges by
the State,Justice Marshall proposed "banning the use of peremptory challenges by prosecutors
and ... allowing the States to eliminate the defendant's peremptories as well." Id. at 107-08.
4 Id. at 99 n.22.
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about peremptories (just as some jurors may resent them), but they
would have a hard time doing without them, for two reasons: (1)
without them voir dire would have to be more detailed and search-
ing, to uncover potentially disqualifying biases; and (2) the avalabil-
ity of peremptories insulates most contested decisions on juror im-
partiality from review on appeal, since a party cannot generally
complain about the judge's failure to excuse a juror for cause unless
the party has exhausted its peremptory challenges."' And, judging
from the case law since Batson, appellate judges are not interested in
Justice Marshall's proposal either, in part, no doubt, because in the
absence of peremptories they would have to scrutinize jury selection
more carefully.
As long as we keep peremptories, some level of racial discrimina-
tion in their use will occur. It is, in effect, built into the procedure.
But that does not mean Batson is toothless. Batson gives trial-court
judges a great deal of power to act or to refrain from acting on plau-
sible claims of discrimination. Judges can choose to use this power to
prevent egregious racial discrimination in jury selection. Across the
country, Batson has probably done a great deal to reduce the number
of black defendants who are tried by all-white juries, and to increase
the proportion of black jurors in all trials. The extent of this effect
depends, no doubt, on local factors that might have had some of the
same effect even under Swain: A black population ith significant
political power-including the power to influence the appointment
and election of judges and prosecutors-and a strong criminal de-
fense bar. Philadelphia has both, and their impact is evident from
these data: Overall, black jurors are, if anything, over-represented on
capital juries.
Can we do something to eliminate subtler forms of race discrimi-
nation in the use of peremptories-at least in capital jury selection? I
wonder. We could try tightening the procedure for reviewding deci-
sions to strike. 9 But considering the latitude that is inherent in the
concept of peremptor, challenge-one that may be exercised for any
reason (except race and sex)-and the difficulty ofjudging an attor-
ney's motivation in the midst of trial proceedings, a move in that di-
rection is unlikely to change much. For example, consider the prin-
ciple problem that Professor Baldus and his colleagues have
identified: The overwhelming exclusion of young black venire mem-
See, eg., United States v. Torres, 960 F.2d 226. 228 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Hardy,
941 F.2d 893,897 (9th Cir. 1991); People v. Macrander, 828 P.2d 234,246 (Colo. 1992); People
v. Daniels, 665 N.E.2d 1221, 1226 (1996); State v. Mitchell, 674 So. 2d 250. 254 (La. 1996); De-
garmo v. State, 922 S.W.2d 256, 262-63 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996). Se general Morris B. Hoffman.
Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished. A Tial Judge's Pensxditw, 64 U. C1. L RE . 809. 857
(1997). This protection is reinforced by two common patterns of trial-court behavior. Attor-
neys avoid exercising all their peremptories, for fear of being stuck %ith a terrible replacement
juror that they cannot remove; and judges deny close calls on challenges for cause. kno-ing
that the losing attorney will probably be in no position to complain.
49 See Baldus et al., supra note 24, at 33-35.
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bers. Under current law, striking jurors because of their youth is
permitted.' Striking them because they are young and black is un-
constitutional-discrimination against young blacks is a form of racial
discrimination-but as long as age discrimination is permitted, prov-
ing this type of race discrimination will be very hard. On the other
hand, if we prohibit age discrimination in the use of peremptories, is
there any logic to permitting discrimination by occupation, or by
education, or by marital status? And if we prohibit these and other
similar distinctions, aren't we back at Justice Marshall's rejected pro-
posal to simply eliminate peremptories all together?
How about reducing the number of peremptories that are allo-
cated to the State?5' That might reduce the specific problem identi-
fied here, but it is not clear by how much. Prosecutors in capital tri-
als in Philadelphia already use fewer peremptories than defense
attorneys.5 2 A drastic cut in their allotment-say, to ten, while leaving
the defense at twenty-would force some prosecutors to cut back, but
not necessarily enough to address the main problem Professor Baldus
and colleagues have identified, considering that young black venire
members (male and female together) average only about three to five
perjury panel. Moreover, as the researchers note, defense attorneys
are just as racially motivated as prosecutors in their use of perempto-
ries; in some contexts, they too might be able to effectively exclude
the racial groups they disfavor. 54 In short, as long as we continue to
use peremptory challenges in criminal cases, it may be unrealistic to
expect any application of Batson to produce juries that are substan-
tially more representative than what we have seen thus far. Indeed,
in many parts of the country it would be a considerable achievement
to obtain capital juries that are as racially representative as those in
Philadelphia, for all their warts.
Professor Baldus and his colleagues also examined the effect of
the racial composition of the juries on the outcomes of these capital
cases. They found that juries ith more black members were consid-
erably less likely to impose the death penalty than juries with fewer
black members, particularly when the defendant was black." This
finding is especially striking because it is based on the decisions of
those jurors who survived peremptory challenges. And it was a severe
winnowing. A majority of all black venire members in the Baldus
sample were excused by the prosecution, and a majority of all white
venire members were excused by the defense. It is safe to assume
that each side focused its fire-as best it could-on those potential
jurors who were most likely to favor the opposition. That means the
50 See, e.g., Melilli, supra note 37, at 483-87.
51 See Baldus et al., supra note 24, at 33-35.
52 Id. at 116-17.
54 For example, in Georgia v. McCollum, supra note 36, the issue was the use of peremptories
by defense attorneys representing white defendants to exclude blackjurors.
See Baldus et al., supra note 24, at figs.5 & 6.
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prosecutors removed the most predictably anti-death penalty blacks,
and the defense attorneys got rid of the most clearly pro-death pen-
alty whites. As a result, the black jurors who actually sat on these
cases are likely to have been uncommonly similar to the remaining
whites in their willingness to vote for death, and the whites who sat
are likely to have been closer in that respect to the remaining blacks.
The differences that Baldus et al. found were those remaining after
the leveling effect ofjury selection itself.
In other words, capital prosecutors and defense lawyers in Phila-
delphia know what they are doing. Race really is a powerful predictor
of capital sentencing, especially in black-defendant cases, and it may
also (as many attorneys believe) predict jurors' predispositions on
guilt as well. But why?
William Bowers, Benjamin Steiner and Maria Sand)s have studied
the behavior of capital jurors by talking to them. This sounds simple
enough, but in practice it is an even more daunting task than the one
undertaken by Professor Baldus and his collaborators. The findings
they report here are culled from the small mountain of data collected
for the Capital Jury Project (CJP),56 a decade-long collection of stud-
ies that includes in-depth interviews with 1,136jurors who served on
332 capital trials in 14 states. The portion they report here concerns
the effects of race; these are only initial findings, as the CJP -as de-
signed for other purposes. Doctor Bowers and his colleagues are now
in the planning stages of a comparable study focusing specifically on
the impact of race on capital juries.
As a group, the cases that Doctor Bowers and his colleagues exam-
ined are markedly different from those studied by Baldus and his as-
sociates. In Baldus's Philadelphia sample, 83% of the defendants
(2 28 / 2 74 )e and about 40% of the jurors who served were black." In
Bowers's CJP sample, fewer than 40% of the defendants (126/332)
and fewer than 10% of the jurors (110/1,136) were black. Nonethe-
less, the racial effects on sentencing outcomes are similar. As in
Philadelphia, Bowers and his colleagues report that as the number of
black jurors increases, the proportion of death sentences decreases,
especially in black-defendant cases. Bowers and his colleagues, how-
ever, find that in their sample this pattern is due primarily to striking
differences in death-sentencing rates in cases with black defendants
and white victims, 62 and that the effect seems to turn primarily on the
presence or absence of male jurors: As the number of white males
increases, the probability of a death sentence increases sharply; as the
number of black males increases, it goes down at a comparable rate.
Unlike Baldus and his associates, Bowers et al. were able to ex-
See supra note 26.
58 See Baldus et al., supra note 24, at fig.3.
9 This calculation is a rough estimatefrom my analysis of ie Baldus data.
Bowers et al, supra note 25, at tbl.1
Feb. 2001]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
plore some of the reasons behind these stark racial differences in
death sentencing. They identified three major determinants of capi-
tal sentencing. First, the jurors in their studies were less likely to sen-
tence to death if they had lingering doubts about the guilt of the de-
fendant, even after they had convicted him by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. Second, they were more likely to do so if they be-
lieved the defendant posed a danger offuture violence. Third, they were
often moved to mercy if they believed the defendant felt genuine re-
morse for his crimes. Black jurors were more likely than white jurors
to view the defendant favorably on each of these issues; in cases with
black defendants and white victims, these differences are striking.
It is not surprising to find these biases in American jurors. Given
the history of racism and segregation, this is exactly what we ought to
expect that white jurors would trust the State's witnesses more and
the defendant less than would black jurors, and as a result have fewer
doubts about the defendant's guilt; that white jurors would be more
likely than black jurors to see a black defendant as a future threat-
especially if he had already killed another white person; and that
white jurors would be less likely than black jurors to trust expressions
of remorse from a black defendant, especially one who had killed a
white victim. Racial distinctions like these affect decision makers
across the range of the criminal justice system, but there is every rea-
son to expect that they are at their worst in capital sentencing. The
decision to condemn a defendant to death or to spare him is ex-
tremely rare, and uniquely burdened with emotional and moral con-
flict. At the same time, it is an almost entirely discretionary choice
that may be made on the basis of an indefinitely large range of fac-
tors. Because there are virtually no formal restrictions on this deci-
sion-and little effective direction-those jurors who want to dis-
criminate deliberately are not restrained, and those who try to be
even-handed have no guideposts to counteract their unconscious ra-
cial biases.
And how does all this apply to the trial of Lonnie Weeks? Did
race play a role in his death sentence? We know that Weeks-who
was executed on March 16, 2000-was black,6l and that the man he
killed was white. s The day after the killing Weeks spontaneously con-
fessed and expressed deep remorse for his crime. He also voluntarily
wrote a letter to ajail officer admitting the killing and expressing re-
morse.6 He did so again from the witness stand, at the penalty phase
of his trial 67
The jurors were clearly moved. Weeks had been stopped in a sto-
len car, and shot a State trooper six times, at point-blank range, with
NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, DEATH Row U.S.A. REPORTER, winter
2000 at 60.
Weeks v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d 379, 474 (Va. 1994).
Weeks v. Angelone, 120 S. CL 727, 729-30 (2000).
V7 See id. at 739 (Stevens,J, dissenting).
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hollow-point bullets. Nonetheless, they declined to find that he
"would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a con-
tinuing serious threat to society."6 The jury, however, did find that
the killing was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman,"
an aggravating circumstance that made him eligible for the death
penalty.' They then asked the judge if the), could nonetheless sen-
tence Weeks to life imprisonment, and when the judge refused to an-
swer, they sentenced him to death." We also know that when they
were polled on that verdict "a majority of the jury members [were] in
tears."71 Still, in Chief Justice Rehnquist's view, we cannot "know" "
and should not "speculate"" about the one aspect of the jury's delib-
erations that seems most clear: At least some jurors felt coerced by
the judge's instructions to return a verdict of death. The meaning of
the Chief Justice's pronouncements is no mystery: We don't %ant to
know, so we can remain free to speculate as we ish.
And what about race--did race influence the jury's verdict? On
that question, we are truly ignorant. We do not know the race ofju-
rors who served (let alone of those who were excused), or how they
interacted with each other, or how they reached their decision.
Lonnie Weeks's expressions of remorse seem to have been influen-
tial. Would they have carried the day had he been white, or had his
victim been black, or if the proportion of black jurors (whatever it
was) had been different? The research reported here suggests that
these factors might have been influential, but we cannot tell. Doctor
Bowers and his colleagues, like Professor Baldus and his, do want to
know the answers to questions of this sort. Thanks to their efforts we
have learned a lot about the impact of race on capital jury delibera-
tions, and we stand to learn a great deal more yet.
68 Id at 729-731.
69 1dat731.
0 Id. at 730-31. See supra notes 1-9 and accompan)ing ICXL
SId. at 740 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
72 Id. at 733.
73 Id at 734 n.5.
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